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The Exon-Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 provides the President of the United States or his designee the authority
to review the effects on U.S. national security of mergers, takeovers, and acquisi-
tions by foreign persons that could result in foreign control of U.S. firms.' An
Executive Order of December 27, 1988, gave authority for enforcing the Exon-
Florio amendment to the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS), which another Executive Order had created in 1975 solely
as a mechanism for assessing the impact of foreign investment in the United
States.' The Treasury Department chairs the CFIUS, which includes assistant-
secretary level representatives from the Commerce, Justice, State, and Defense
Departments as well as from the Office of Management and Budget, the Council
of Economic Advisors, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
On July 14, 1989, the Department of the Treasury published draft regulations
for implementing the Exon-Florio amendment. For over two years these draft
regulations served as guidance to foreign investors while the Treasury Department
drafted the final version of the regulations. On November 21,1991, the Treasury
Department published the final Exon-Florio regulations, which maintain the basic
approach of the draft regulations, but also contain several noteworthy changes.4
Finally, on October 23, 1992, President Bush signed into law the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, which contained an amendment
that expanded the scope of the Exon-Florio statute. 5 The amendment was spon-
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sored by Senators Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) and J.J. Exon (D-Neb.), one of
the sponsors of the original Exon-Florio provision.
Congress passed the 1992 Byrd-Exon amendment in response to the unsuccessful
attempt by Thomson-CSF, a partially state-owned French company, to acquire the
missile division of LTV Corp., a U.S. aerospace company. 6 The Byrd-Exon amend-
ment expanded the scope of the Exon-Florio provision in several ways, most notably
by requiring a formal investigation by the CFIUS whenever an otherwise relevant ac-
quisition is made by an entity controlled by a foreign government. Previously, the
decision to initiate an investigation was left to the discretion of the CFIUS.
This article reviews the key provisions of the Exon-Florio statute as amended
and the final regulations and describes their implications for foreign investors and
foreign lenders who do business in the United States.
I. The Exon-Florio Statute and Filial Regulations
A. THE EXON-FLORIO PROCESS
The Exon-Florio law sets forth a procedure under which parties involved in
certain foreign investments in the United States may request a review of the
investment's national security implications. Highlighting the voluntary nature of
Exon-Florio filings is important because the statute does not require such filings,
rather, it is a "safe harbor" or "preclearance" type of filing.
The term "voluntary" is disingenuous, however, because if a filing is not
made, the President retains the theoretical right to order a foreign acquiror to
divest itself of a U.S. entity if the President (based on a CFIUS investigation)
determines that national security reasons exist for such divestiture.' Because the
consequences of not filing can be severe, prudence generally dictates that parties
should make Exon-Florio filings with respect to investments that arguably fall
within the ambit of the law.
The Exon-Florio statute establishes time frames for completing a preliminary
review and any subsequent investigation. Within thirty days of receiving notifica-
tion of a proposed merger, acquisition, or takeover, CFIUS must conclude a pre-
liminary review and determine whether a full investigation should be undertaken. 8
A formal investigation is mandatory, however, if an entity controlled by a foreign
government makes the acquisition. 9 If a full investigation is begun, CFIUS has
forty-five days within which to complete the inquiry and report to the President.'o
Upon receiving the CFIUS recommendation, the President has fifteen days to de-
6. See, e.g., French Government Ownership of Thomson Should Bar LTV Takeover, Panel Told,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 109, at D-27 (June 5, 1992) available in LEXIS, NEXIS
Library, DREXEC File.
7. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1991).
8. Id. § 2170(a).
9. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463 (1992).
10. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
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cide what action, if any, is to be taken with respect to the proposed transaction. "
The regulations provide that either a party to the transaction or a member of
the CFIUS may submit notice of a transaction to the CFIUS. 2 Exon-Florio notices
must provide the following information:
1. a summary of the transaction;
2. the name and address of the foreign person making the acquisition and its
affiliates;
3. the name and address of the U.S. entity being acquired;
4. the name, address, and nationality of the parent of the foreign person
making the acquisition;
5. the names, addresses, and nationalities of the persons who will control the
U.S. entity being acquired;
6. the date for concluding the transaction;
7. a description of the assets of the U.S. entity being acquired;
8. a description of the business activity acquired and any entity of which it
is a parent, including classified contracts, security clearances, and products
or technical data subject to U.S. export licenses, among other things;
9. a description of the business activity of the foreign person making the
acquisition and any affiliates;
10. the plans of the foreign person for the U.S. entity including plans to reduce,
eliminate, or sell research and development facilities, to close or to move off-
shore existing facilities within the United States, or to change product quality;
and
11. a list of any filings or reports made with U.S. government agencies with
respect to the acquisition."
Exon-Florio filings have no set form; parties are encouraged to present the
required information in whatever form they believe would be most helpful to the
CFIUS. In addition, parties may present argument in Exon-Florio filings as to
why the transaction does not present national security concerns.
If, after its thirty-day preliminary review, the CFIUS determines no investiga-
tion is necessary, it will so notify the parties and no further action will be taken.1
4
If, however, the CFIUS decides a full investigation is required (or an investigation
is mandatory in cases involving acquisitions by foreign government-controlled
entities), it will conduct its forty-five-day investigation and make a report to the
President. 15 The President then has fifteen days to decide whether or not to take
any action regarding the transaction.' 6 The President may take no action against
11. Id. § 2170(c).
12. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a), (b) (1992). The regulations do not permit third parties to submit
notice to CFIUS. Id. § 800.40(d).
13. 31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (1992).
14. Id. § 800.502.
15. Id. § 800.503-.504
16. Id. § 800.601(a).
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the transaction, prohibit the transaction, or, if the transaction is already com-
pleted, order the foreign acquiror to divest itself of the U.S. entity.17 No matter
what decision the President reaches, he must make a written report to Congress
with the reasons for his decision.'
8
The final regulations specify that in either a review or investigation, the CFIUS
shall examine the following three issues:
1. whether the acquisition could result in foreign control of a U.S. person;
2. whether credible evidence supports a belief that such foreign control could
threaten to impair national security; and
3. whether any other provisions of law are adequate to protect the national
security. "
Since the publication of the draft Exon-Florio regulations on July 14, 1989,
the CFIUS has reviewed 773 transactions, as of January 15, 1993.20 Of the
transactions reviewed, the CFIUS has conducted fifteen investigations.2 1 Thus,
the statistical probability of any particular transaction being investigated is quite
low. The thirteen investigations for which information is publicly available in-
volved the following transactions:
1. Ascom Holding AG, a Swiss firm, and Mercedes Information Technolo-
gies (Pty.) Ltd., a South African firm-acquisition of Timeplex, Inc., a
division of Unisys Corporation that designs, manufactures, and services
communications networks.22
2. Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd., a Swiss-Swedish firm, joint venture with West-
inghouse Electric Corp.-a manufacturer of high voltage electrical trans-
mission and distribution equipment.23
3. China National Aerospace Technology Import and Export Corp. (CATIC),
a Chinese state-owned company- acquisition of MAMCO Manufactur-
ing, Inc., a manufacturer of aircraft components.
24
4. Fanuc Ltd., a Japanese company-acquisition of 40 percent of Moore
Special Tool Co., a manufacturer of precision machine tools used in the
production of nuclear weapons. 5
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1991).
18. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463 (1992).
19. 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a) (1992).
20. Telephone conference with the CFIUS staff (Jan. 15, 1993).
21. Id.
22. White House Will Not Block Unisys Unit's Acquisition by Swiss, South African Firms, Int'l
Fin. Daily (BNA), Sept. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
23. Bush Won't Block Swiss Electric Deal After CFIUS Exon-Florio Investigation, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA) No. 96 (May 19, 1989), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File.
24. Chinese Company Seeking "Solution" to Order to Divest Aircraft Parts Maker, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 302 (Feb 28, 1990).
25. Robert Thomson, Japanese Drop Plan to Buy Into U.S. Tool Group, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1991.
VOL. 27, NO. 3
EXON-FLORIO STATUTE 799
5. Huels AG, a West German firm-acquisition of Monsanto Electronic Ma-
terials Co., a maker of silicon wafers.
26
6. Hoffnan-LaRoche, a Swiss company-acquisition of a division of Cetus
involved in biotechnology, specifically polymerase chain reaction tech-
nology.27
7. Lalbhai Group, an Indian company-acquisition of Tachonics Corp., a
manufacturer of computer chips with military application.2"
8. Matra SA, a French company-acquisition of three divisions of Fairchild
Industries involved in space and defense electronics technology.29
9. Minorco SA, a Luxembourg company controlled by DeBeers Consolidated
Mines, a South African company-hostile takeover of Consolidated Gold
Fields, PLC, a British firm that owned nearly 50 percent of Newmont Mining
Corporation, a U.S. mining company that is a significant producer of gold. 0
10. Nippon Sanso KK, a Japanese company-acquisition of Hercules Inc.'s
Semi-Gas Systems, a supplier of industrial gases to the semiconductor chip
industry.3
11. Saint Gobain, a French company-acquisition of Norton Co., a manufacturer
of advanced ceramic high-technology bearings and ceramic aircraft engine
parts that had classified contracts with the U.S. Government.32
12. Tokuyama Soda Co. Ltd., a Japanese company-acquisition of General
Ceramics, Inc., a manufacturer of ceramic beryllium products used in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons.33
13. Thomson-CSF, a partially state-owned French company-acquisition of
LTV Aerospace's missile and aircraft divisions.34
Of the investigations conducted by the CFIUS, only one-the acquisition of
MAMCO Manufacturing Inc. by CATIC-resulted in a divestiture order by the
26. Bush Approves Sale of U.S. Wafer Maker to German Firm, Florio Raises Questions, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 25 (Feb. 8, 1989), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC
File.
27. Cetus to sell PCR business to Hoffinan-LaRoche for $300 million plus royalties, PRESS RE-
LEASE, BUSINESS WIRE, INC., July 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRNT File.
28. Bush Won't Block Indian Acquisition of U.K. Firm with U.S. Technology, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 86, at A-12 (May 3, 1990), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC
File.
29. Bush Will Not Block Acquisition of Space, Defense Units by French Firm, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 161 (Aug. 22, 1989), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File.
30. CFIUS Finds No National Security Threat in South African Bid for U.K. Minerals Firm, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 57 (Mar. 27, 1989), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC
File.
31. Bush Won't Intervene in Sale of Semiconductor Firm to Japanese, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 146, at A-12 (July 30, 1990), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File.
32. Bush Will Not Block French Deal for U.S. Classified Contractor, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 154 (Aug. 9, 1990), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File.
33. Leah J. Nathans, Meet Wall Street's New Bugaboo: CFIUS, Bus. WK., June 12, 1989, at
90.
34. At a Glance, 24 NAT'L J., July 11, 1992, at 1644, 1645.
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President.35 President Bush ordered CATIC to divest itself of all its interest in
MAMCO that it had acquired before the CFIUS had completed its investigation.36
In five of the investigations the notifying parties voluntarily withdrew their
notices. In one of the withdrawn notices the acquiring Japanese company, Fanuc
Ltd., cited political pressure from the United States Congress as a factor in its
decision to withdraw, even though the CFIUS reportedly had made a favorable
recommendation to President Bush. 37 Such congressional interest-which is out-
side the formal Exon-Florio process-and the attendant negative publicity it
generates for the acquiring company is a consideration for foreign investors filing
Exon-Florio notices, as members of Congress increasingly challenge acquisitions
that are the subject of Exon-Florio notices.
B. THE DECISION TO FILE AN EXON-FLORIO NOTICE
A foreign investor acquiring a U.S. company that appears to have a relation
to national security generally must focus, at least initially, on three issues in
deciding whether to file an Exon-Florio notice: (1) Is the transaction an "acquisi-
tion"? (2) Would it result in "control"? (3) If so, could it impair "national
security"?
Exon-Florio does not cover transactions that do not meet each of these jurisdic-
tional requirements. Where parties are uncertain as to whether a transaction meets
these requirements, it is often advisable to file an Exon-Florio notice. Such a
notice could include a discussion of why the parties believe the transaction does
not meet the specific jurisdictional requirements of Exon-Florio.
A foreign investor must first determine if the transaction is an acquisition under
35. Chinese Company Seeking "Solution " to Order to Divest Aircraft Parts Maker, supra note 24.
36. Firm Ordered Divested by Bush to Be Acquired by U. S. Company, Daily, Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 57 (Mar 25, 1991), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File. President Bush
ordered CATIC to divest within three months, but CATIC later was granted an additional three months
to find a purchaser. Id. CATIC could not find a purchaser, however, and the U.S. Treasury placed
MAMCO under a U.S. trusteeship that barred CATIC from MAMCO's management and prohibited
Chinese officials from gaining access to MAMCO's facilities. Id. Eventually, thirteen months after
the issuance of the divestiture order, it was announced that CATIC had found a U.S. buyer for
MAMCO. Id. Administration sources noted that certain confidential information concerning CATIC's
"past practices" led to the divestiture order. Chinese Company Seeking "Solution" to Order to Divest
Aircraft Parts Maker, supra note 24.
37. Thomson, supra note 25. Fanuc Ltd., a Japanese company, withdrew its Exon-Florio notice
even though the CFIUS allegedly had made a favorable recommendation to President Bush. Id. The
President did not respond within the fifteen-day statutory period because of uncertainty associated
with the temporary lapse of the statutory authority for Exon-Florio. Id. In addition, several key
Congressmen, including House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, vigorously opposed the transac-
tion. National Security Review Process Sharply Criticized at House Hearing, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 39, at A-12 (Feb. 27, 1991), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File. Such
opposition led to the scheduling of a congressional hearing specifically to review the Fanuc acquisition.
Id. The scheduling of the hearing was reported to be a factor in Fanuc's decision to drop its acquisition
efforts, and, indeed, Congressman Gephardt credited "congressional pressure" as the reason for
Fanuc's withdrawal. Id.
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Exon-Florio. The final Exon-Florio regulations define acquisition collectively
as an "acquisition, merger, or takeover" to include an acquisition of an entity
by the purchase of its voting securities; the conversion of its convertible voting
securities; or the acquisition of its convertible voting securities or proxies, if this
involves the acquisition of control over the U.S. entity.38
The term "acquisition" also includes the acquisition of a business, including
production or research and development facilities if the technology or personnel
of the business will be substantially used. 39 An acquisition also can be a consolida-
tion.4° Finally, an acquisition can include a joint venture if the U.S. entity contri-
butes an existing business over which the foreign person would gain control
through the joint venture.4 The regulations appear not to apply, however, to
so-called "greenfield investments" by foreign firms, that is, entirely new ventures
started from scratch.
Any analysis of whether the transaction at issue is an acquisition for purposes
of Exon-Florio by necessity requires an examination of the second issue: whether
the transaction will result in the foreign person having control over the U.S.
entity. The regulations define control to mean the power through the "ownership
of a majority or a dominant minority of the total ... voting securities ... or by
proxy voting, contractual arrangements or other means, to determine, direct or
decide matters affecting an entity,, 42 including, without limitation, decisions
regarding the following:
1. the sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of any or all of the
principal assets of the business;
2. the dissolution of the entity;
3. the closing or relocation of the entity's production or research and develop-
ment facilities;
4. the termination or nonfulfillment of the entity's contracts; or
5. the amendment of the entity's articles of incorporation regarding any of the
above matters.43
This broad definition of control may, in some cases, make it difficult to evaluate
whether a foreign investor is in a position to acquire control of the U.S. entity
because it contains no objective "bright line" test for control. The definition
provides no minimum percentage of stock ownership that would conclusively
indicate control.
Third, assuming the acquisition involves control, the foreign investor must
focus on whether it could impair the U.S. national security. This issue is often
difficult for a foreign investor to resolve because, as mentioned previously, neither
38. 31 C.F.R. § 800.201(a) (1992).
39. Id. § 800.201(b).
40. Id. § 800.201(c).
41. Id. § 800.301(b)(5).
42. Id. § 800.204.
43. Id.
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the statute nor the regulations define national security. Indeed, the European
Community and its Member States issued a joint declaration on February 18,
1992, warning the United States that Exon-Florio had caused a great deal of
uncertainty for European companies and that the heart of the uncertainty was the
failure to define national security."4
Although the statute does not define national security, it states that the following
factors may be considered in evaluating a transaction's effect on national security:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activities by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet
the requirements of national security.45
Two further factors were added to the original Exon-Florio statute by the
Byrd-Exon amendment in 1992: (4) the potential effects of a transaction on U.S.
international technological leadership affecting U.S. national security; 46 and (5)
the potential effects of a transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, and
technology to a country identified as supporting terrorism or a country of concern
47
regarding proliferation of missiles or nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
Consequently, these factors (4) and (5) may not have been considered in Exon-
Florio decisions prior to that time.
The regulations also do not define "national security." The background section
of the regulations refers to the legislative history of the statute and notes that the
term "is to be broadly interpreted and without limitation to particular indus-
tries.' , 48 In addition that section states that "[g]enerally speaking, transactions that
involve products, services, and technologies that are important to U.S. national
defense requirements will usually be deemed significant with respect to the na-
tional security." 49 It further provides that notice to CFIUS will "clearly be appro-
priate when, for example, a company is being acquired that provides products or
key technologies essential to U.S. defense requirements. ' °
As a starting point a foreign investor should determine whether the company
to be acquired provides products, technologies, or services to the U.S. military,
either as a contractor or a subcontractor. Reviewing the types of companies that
have been the subject of prior CFIUS investigations is also useful. Several of the
44. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated with Exon-Florio, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA)
No. 33, at A-5 (Feb. 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, DREXEC File.
45. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1991).
46. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
47. Id.
48. 31 C.F.R. 800 app. (1992).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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investigations involved companies making high technology products or compo-
nents.
51
Foreign investors considering whether to file an Exon-Florio notice should go
beyond the guidance offered in the statute and regulations and focus initially on
three additional steps. First, the foreign investor should determine whether the
U.S. firm has any government contracts and, if so, whether it has any security
clearances either for its facilities or its personnel. The existence of government
contracts and security clearances is a key factor in the CFIUS's interest in re-
viewing a proposed acquisition.
Second, the foreign investor should examine the market share for the U.S.
firm's products or services and the number and nationality of other suppliers of
the same products or services. CFIUS and its members normally query whether,
in the case of a national emergency or armed conflict, the United States would
still have adequate access to the relevant products or services from suppliers other
than the U.S. firm, assuming foreigners control the firm.
Third, once the foreign investor has researched the answers to these and other
questions, it would do well to approach the CFIUS staff and inquire on a non-
attribution basis (that is, without disclosing the client's name) how they view the
proposed transaction. Obviously, the staff's response is not binding, but it is often
helpful, particularly if the CFIUS has reviewed similar transactions in the past
but chosen not to conduct an investigation.
C. ABUSE OF EXON-FLORIO AS A HOSTILE TAKEOVER DEFENSE
Targets of a hostile takeover by a foreign company have attempted to invoke
Exon-Florio as a defense against the takeover, an action sometimes referred to
as the "Pentagon Ploy." 52 If successful in invoking Exon-Florio, the target will
cause a minimum delay of thirty days and possibly up to ninety days if the CFIUS
undertakes an investigation. Of course, if the President decides to block the
takeover, the target will have succeeded definitively in defending against the
acquisition.
The CFIUS is well aware, however, of the potential for abuse of Exon-Florio
as a hostile takeover defense. 53 It maintains that it has become adept at sifting
through the self-serving information provided by targets and assessing objectively
whether a national security concern exists. 54 Nonetheless, the target may have
succeeded in triggering at least a thirty-day review period.
Even if the takeover involves a legitimate national security concern, the possi-
bility remains that the target company could cause additional delay by refusing
51. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
52. Richard J. Conway & William F. Savarino, Defense Strategies to Protect Against Foreign
Investment, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at SI1, S11-12.
53. Telephone conference with the CFIUS staff (Mar. 25, 1992).
54. Id.
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to provide either the bidder or the CFIUS with the information required in the
Exon-Florio notice, which is primarily in the hands of the target company (that
is, business activities, classified contracts, and the like). The CFIUS contends
that this potential abuse has not been a problem and has only caused a minor delay
in one instance involving a hostile takeover.55
D. RELATION TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
Early determination by a foreign investor contemplating the acquisition of a
U.S. entity as to whether the entity has security clearances is important. As
mentioned previously, the existence of security clearances will mean a heightened
concern on the part of the CFIUS and a greater likelihood for the appropriateness
of submitting an Exon-Florio notice. More importantly, however, security clear-
ances will trigger yet another law and set of regulations that are potentially a far
greater obstacle than the Exon-Florio process.
The Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Investigative Service (DIS) im-
poses certain limitations on the ability of firms having security clearances to retain
such clearances if they become subject to foreign ownership, control, or influence
(FOCI).56 FOCI may result from direct foreign ownership or participation in the
cleared company or from the ownership or participation of U.S. firms whose
ultimate parents are foreign.57 Depending on the extent of foreign ownership or
participation, the regulation will (1) require the adoption of board resolutions or
(2) require the foreign firm to place the stock of the cleared U.S. company in a
voting trust or require the use of a proxy agreement to shield the stock from
foreign control.58 Such a voting trust or proxy arrangement would limit the ability
of the foreign party to control or influence the cleared company on such major
matters as sales or disposal of the company's assets, mergers, and bankruptcy
(although the foreign party may make nonbinding suggestions to the trustees/
proxy holders). 59 Additionally, DIS generally requires that the trustees or proxy
holders be U.S. citizens who are eligible for personnel clearances and who have
no prior relationship with the foreign or cleared parties. 60 In certain exceptional
situations, avoiding these strict requirements and entering into a "customized"
security arrangement with DIS may be possible if high level DOD officials make
a finding that such an arrangement is in the national interest.61
The foreign investor must address all security clearance matters as rapidly as
possible. If DIS does not approve the mechanism for dealing with the security
55. Id.
56. Dep't of Defense, Industrial Security Reg. No. 5220.22-R, sec. II, pt. 2 (1985).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2-205(b).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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clearances by the time the acquisition is consummated, the acquired company will
suffer a temporary invalidation of its security clearances. 62 This action would, in
turn, prohibit the U.S. entity from bidding on any new government contracts (the
contracts requiring the security clearances in the first instance) until the DIS
requirements are satisfied. Depending on the amount of government contract
work performed by the U.S. entity, such a temporary invalidation could have
serious economic consequences for the newly acquired company.
II. Foreign Lenders
As discussed previously, the definition of control is broad with no bright-line
standards. Indeed, the definition is broad enough that a foreign lender who fore-
closes on the stock or assets of a U.S. entity whose acquisition it financed will
be considered to be in a position to "control" the U.S. entity for Exon-Florio
purposes. 63 Consequently, a foreign lender would have to analyze the appropriate-
ness of filing an Exon-Florio notice much as if it were a foreign company making
an outright acquisition of a U.S. entity.
The biggest potential problem for foreign lenders is that the final regulations
provide that the CFIUS will not accept notice of financings by foreign lenders
unless the foreign lender acquires control at the time of the transaction. 64 Thus,
absent some unusual loan covenants conferring functional control, a foreign lender
does not have the ability to file an Exon-Florio notice prior to the financing.
The CFIUS will accept notices of financing provided by foreign lenders where
"because of imminent or actual default or other condition there is a significant
possibility" that the foreign lender could obtain control of the U.S. company.65
The preamble section on "Foreign Lenders" states that the CFIUS would not
consider "standard provisions" in a loan contract such as "ordinary covenants
of the borrower pertaining to liens, or a lender's right of veto over mergers or
the sale of property" to confer control over the borrower.
66
In deciding whether a loan transaction results in foreign control over a U.S.
company, the CFIUS will take into account arrangements the foreign lender might
make to transfer day-to-day control to U.S. nationals. 67 As an example, the
preamble to the regulations notes that the CFIUS could determine a lender has
no control of a company acquired through default when it "appoints a trustee to
run the company and commits to sell it within a specified period.',
68
The CFIUS will not consider a foreign lender in a syndicate to have control
62. Id. at 2-203.
63. 31 C.F.R. § 800.303(a) (1992).
64. Id. § 800.303(a)(1).
65. Id. § 800.303(a)(2).
66. Id. pt. 800 app.
67. Id. § 800.303(a)(3).
68. Id. pt. 800 app.
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for purposes of Exon-Florio where the foreign lender: (1) requires the consent
of the majority of the U.S. lenders participating in the syndicate and cannot
unilaterally take any action; or (2) does not have a lead role in the syndicate and
is subject to a provision in the loan documents limiting its influence so that control
for purposes of Exon-Florio could not be acquired. 69
Because the foreign lender normally cannot file a notice until default is immi-
nent, that lender is put in the position of preparing a notice when its relations with
the borrower-the entity to be acquired-have undoubtedly soured, making it
difficult to obtain the information required. The inability to obtain the necessary
information may delay the filing because the regulations require all parties to a
transaction for which a joint filing is being made to sign the filing indicating that
each party is satisfied the information in the filing is accurate and complete.7 ° If
fewer than all parties to a transaction submit a notice, each notifying party must
provide all requested information with respect to itself and "to the extent known
or reasonably available to it, with respect to each non-notifying party.' M
If the notifying party cannot submit all relevant information pertaining to the
nonnotifying party, the staff chairman of the CFIUS may delay the acceptance
of the notice and, consequently, the beginning of the thirty-day review period.
7 2
Also, if necessary, the CFIUS Staff Chairman may request the nonnotifying party
to provide the relevant information within seven days of such request.
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III. Conclusion
Foreign investors and foreign lenders doing business in the United States need
to be aware of Exon-Florio if they are acquiring, or financing the acquisition of,
U.S. companies that involve national security concerns. Failure to comply with
Exon-Florio can result in delays and uncertainties in contemplated transactions.
With proper assessment of the proposed transaction and careful planning, how-
ever, such delays and uncertainties can be minimized.
69. Id. § 800.303(b).
70. Id. § 800.402(a).
71. Id. § 800.402(b)(1).
72. Id. § 800.402(b)(2).
73. Id.
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